A week of Islamist terror: two plots in 72 hours, both targeting Jews

The short answer #

This week delivered two major Islamist terror incidents within 72 hours. On September 30, 2026, a copilot on a Flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv attacked the captain with a crash axe in an attempted hijacking that UAE prosecutors classified as a terrorist act. On October 2, UK police charged two Iranian nationals with plotting a chlorine bomb attack on Manchester's Jewish community, timed for Yom Kippur.

Both plots targeted Jewish communities or Israel-bound civilians. Both demonstrate the continued operational capability of Islamist actors, whether individually radicalized or state-directed. The Flydubai case exposes a critical security gap: a pilot banned from one airline for extremism was hired by another. The Manchester plot confirms Iran's use of proxy terror operations in Europe.

Key facts #

1. On September 30, 2026, Flydubai flight FZ1073 from Dubai to Tel Aviv was diverted to Saudi Arabia after copilot Hamam al-Hammami attacked the captain with a crash axe in what UAE prosecutors classified as a terrorist act.¹
2. Al-Hammami, an Omani national, had been removed from flight training by Oman Air in 2024 after extremist material was found in his possession, but was subsequently hired by Flydubai.²
3. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the copilot "underwent Islamist radical indoctrination" based on personal information gathered during questioning.³
4. On September 20, 2026, UK police arrested two Iranian nationals—Rahman Salehi, 34, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36—and charged them with preparing a terrorist attack on Manchester's Jewish community, including plans to build a chlorine bomb.⁴
5. The two suspects scouted the Heaton Park Congregation Synagogue and the Jewish Museum in Cheetham Hill, and were directed by a third party believed to be in Iran who provided bomb-making instructions.⁵
6. Heaton Park synagogue was the site of a deadly attack on Yom Kippur in 2025, when a British-Syrian man killed two people and was shot dead by police.⁶

The Flydubai hijacking: what happened in the cockpit #

At some point during Flydubai flight FZ1073 from Dubai to Tel Aviv on September 30, 2026, copilot Hamam al-Hammami attacked the captain with the cockpit's crash axe. UAE Attorney General Hamad Saif Al Shamsi said al-Hammami "attempted to carry out a terrorist act" and "began executing his plan during the flight, attacking the captain inside the flight deck using a crash axe and attempting to take control of the aircraft's flight controls."¹

The attack nearly crashed the flight with 182 people on board before passengers and crew subdued the copilot.⁷ The aircraft was diverted to Saudi Arabia, where it landed safely. The captain and first officer were hospitalized with injuries. A 50-year-old male passenger was also taken to a hospital with an upper-body injury.⁸

Al-Hammami was arrested after the plane landed. Netanyahu said Israel knew the copilot "underwent Islamist radical indoctrination," based on "personal information" gathered during ongoing questioning.³ UAE prosecutors classified the attack as terrorism.¹

Hamam al-Hammami: banned by one airline, hired by another #

Hamam al-Hammami was an Omani national who had been barred from flying on his country's airline because of concerns about extremist views. Oman Air removed al-Hammami from training in 2024 over concerns about his alleged radical views, and he was subsequently assigned an administrative role within the airline.² According to ABC News, citing intelligence and law-enforcement officials, extremist material was found in his possession while he was a trainee copilot in 2024.²

Despite these concerns flagged by Oman Air, the Omani copilot was subsequently hired by Flydubai, and flew the Dubai to Tel Aviv route.² On Wednesday, September 30, he stabbed the pilot and, according to witnesses and UAE prosecutors, tried to crash the plane in an attempted terror attack.¹

The case raises a critical question: if Oman Air had documented concerns about al-Hammami's extremist views and removed him from flight training in 2024, how did Flydubai hire him in a role that gave him access to the cockpit of a passenger jet carrying 182 people? Either the information was not shared, or it was shared and ignored.

The Manchester plot: Iran's chlorine bomb and Yom Kippur #

On September 20, 2026, at the start of Yom Kippur, UK police arrested Rahman Salehi, 34, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, both Iranian nationals, in Manchester. They were charged on October 2 with "preparing to commit or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism" in Manchester "on or before" Yom Kippur.⁴

Prosecutors accused the two men of planning and acquiring the elements to make a chlorine bomb as well as using the internet to identify and research potential targets.⁵ They "carried out a hostile reconnaissance within Manchester's Jewish community, identifying attempted targets such as the Jewish Museum and Heaton Park Synagogue."⁵

A third party "is alleged to have directed and coordinated the planned attack and provided instructions on how to assemble a homemade explosive device."⁵ That third party is believed to be in Iran.⁵

The two suspects appeared in Westminster Magistrates' Court on October 3, where neither entered a plea. The judge ordered them held until an October 23 appearance at the Central Criminal Court in London.⁴ UK Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans said "we do not believe there to be any ongoing threat to the public in relation to this matter."⁴

The pattern: Islamist terror against Jewish targets #

Both plots targeted Jewish communities or Israel-bound passengers. The Flydubai flight was headed to Tel Aviv. The Manchester plot targeted the Heaton Park Congregation Synagogue and the Jewish Museum in Cheetham Hill, and was timed for Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.

Heaton Park synagogue was already a site of trauma. On October 2, 2025—exactly one year before the UK charged the two Iranian nationals—a British-Syrian man, Jihad al-Shamie, drove a car into pedestrians before stabbing worshippers at the synagogue during Yom Kippur services. Two people were killed: Adrian Daulby, aged 53, and Melvin Cravitz, aged 66. The attacker was shot dead by police. The attack was motivated by antisemitism and Islamic State ideology.⁶

The 2026 plot targeted the same synagogue, on the same holy day, one year later. It was not a random choice of target.

The security gaps: vetting failures and state-sponsored threats #

The Flydubai case exposes a critical gap in aviation security: cross-border information sharing on pilot vetting. If Oman Air removed al-Hammami from training in 2024 due to extremist concerns, and if intelligence officials later found extremist material in his possession, that information should have prevented him from flying for any carrier. Either it was not shared with Flydubai, or Flydubai did not act on it.

The Manchester plot demonstrates a different kind of threat: state-sponsored terrorism. UK prosecutors say the two suspects were directed by a third party in Iran who coordinated the attack and provided bomb-making instructions.⁵ This is not lone-wolf radicalization; it is an intelligence operation run from Tehran, directed at Jewish targets in a European city.

Both cases underscore the need for robust vetting, cross-border intelligence sharing, and vigilance against both individually radicalized actors and state-sponsored networks.

Austria's Sharia controversy: courts, contracts, and pushback #

In a separate development, Austria's political debate over Sharia law continued this week. The controversy began in August 2025, when a Vienna court upheld a €320,000 arbitration award based on Islamic Sharia law. The court ruled that while it could not verify the exact Islamic provisions applied, the outcome did not contradict Austria's fundamental values and could therefore be enforced in civil and property disputes.⁹

The ruling applied only to voluntary arbitration in civil contracts, not to criminal law or family law. But it sparked political backlash. Michael Schilchegger, constitutional spokesman for the Freedom Party (FPÖ), condemned the ruling as a dangerous endorsement of "Islamic parallel societies" and warned it would empower "the will of fanatical Islamists."⁹

On January 13, 2026, Austria's ruling party—the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)—announced the need for a legislative ban on the use of Sharia law in courts. The federal government said it would "permanently put a stop to the application of Sharia rules in Austria."⁹

The debate highlights broader European tensions over the application of religious law in civil disputes and the question of whether Sharia-based arbitration is compatible with secular legal systems.

What this week reveals about the threat in 2026 #

Two operational models. The Flydubai case represents individual radicalization: a pilot who adopted extremist views and acted alone to carry out an attack. The Manchester case represents state-sponsored terrorism: two operatives directed and coordinated by Iranian intelligence, equipped with bomb-making instructions and assigned specific targets.

Continued targeting of Jews. Both plots targeted Jewish communities or Israel-bound passengers. The Manchester plot specifically targeted a synagogue that had been attacked on Yom Kippur the previous year, and was timed for the same holy day. These are not random acts of violence; they are deliberate, ideologically motivated attacks on Jewish targets.

Security failures. The Flydubai case demonstrates a critical gap in aviation security: known extremists can be flagged by one airline and hired by another. This is not a hypothetical risk; it happened, and 182 people nearly died because of it. The solution is straightforward: mandatory cross-border information sharing on pilot vetting, with a global database of individuals removed from flight training or employment for security concerns.

State-sponsored terror persists. The Manchester plot shows Iran continuing to direct terror operations on European soil in 2026. This is not a new development—Iran has used proxy operations for decades—but it confirms the threat remains active and operational.

Vigilance required. Both plots were stopped. The Flydubai attack failed because passengers and crew intervened. The Manchester plot was disrupted by UK police before the attack could be carried out. But both came close to succeeding. The lesson is that Islamist terror—whether individual or state-sponsored—remains an active, evolving threat in 2026, and vigilance, vetting, and enforcement are the tools that stop it.

Sources #

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